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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALLACE R. SMITH, dha SMITH 
REALTY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and App,ellant, 
-vs.-
C. TAYLOR BURTON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8302 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION 
Plaintiff petitions this Honorable Court for a re-
hearing in the above-entitled matter and in support 
thereof states as follows: 
I. That the decision filed on the 1st day of August, 
1955, in the above entitled matter contains a basic mis-. 
application and misconstruction of the so-called Parol 
Evidence Rule as concerns the commission agreement 
dated the 1st of May, 1953. 
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2 
II. That the decision deprives plaintiff without 
any justification of commissions which in equity and 
good conscience were due him and in effect creates a 
penalty and forfeiture. 
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that a rehearing be 
granted and as to the May 1st agreement, the Court af-
firm the lower court's decision. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 1955. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERT & BLACK AND 
DWIGHT L. KING 
BY-------------------------------------------------- .. 
Dwight L. King 
Counsel for Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BRIEF· IN SUPPORT· OF PLAIN·TIFF'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Parties will be referred to throughout this brief as 
they were in the trial court. 
:All italics are ours. 
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STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
In the decision of this court, it held that the trial 
court could not consider parol evidence in interpreting 
and construing the following agreement: 
"As my commission for services in connec-
tion with that Exchange Agreement dated May 
1, 1953 (with Toone) I will take ¥2 of rental fee 
for pastures for the 1953 season until a total of 
$2,000 is paid, together with sorrel horse, saddle 
and bridle. Smith to rernt pastures." 
The facts concerning the drawing and signing of 
the quoted agreement were generally undisputed. It is 
in longhand, was written by the defendant on a scratch 
pad and was drawn without either party consulting or 
being advised by an attorney. 
The agreement was intended by both parties to pro-
vide for a means of payment for commission on the ex-
change of certain real property which was fully con-
summated as a result of the efforts of plaintiff. 
There was no discussion nor claim that the parties 
intended to work a forfeiture or penalty on plaintiff by 
the hastily drawn and unconsidered memorandum. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. THIS COURT HAS MISAPPLIED AND MIS-
CONSTRUED THE SO--CALLED PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
In the decision of the court, it is stated: 
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"It is impossible to determine how such find-
ing could be reached, except by considering parol 
evidence, since such finding is the antithesis of 
the plain terms of the memoradum." 
The quoted language indicates that the court has 
fallen into the error of considering the Parol Evidence 
Rule as a rule of evidence. It has long been conceded 
that the Parol Evidence Rule is a rule of substantive 
law and do'es not concern the receipt or rejection of 
evidence. 
The rule actually concerns whether or not the terms 
of an integrat.ea written instrument may be varied by 
parol evidence. It does not prohibit the receipt by the 
finder of fact of evidence concerning the oral transac-
tions. How the information which remained in an oral 
form can he used by the finder of fact in his interpreta-
tion of the written instrument is the subject of the Parol 
Evidence Rule. The rule has been the subject of a very 
careful and considered opinion by this court. 
In Fa,rr v. Wasatch ChemiCJal Co., 105 Utah 272, 
143 P. 2d 281, this court, after a careful analysis of the 
Parol Evidence Rule, sets. down the principles which are 
applicable and which are not seriously controverted by 
any authority. It stated as follows: 
"* * * The rule is, of course well established, 
but it has no application here. The problem of 
ascertaining when the rule applies to a given 
fact situation is discussed by Wigmore, Sec. 2430 
of his work on Evidence. It is there stated: 'The 
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inquiry is whether the writing was intended to 
cover a certain subject of negotiation; for if it 
was not, then the writing does not embody the 
transaction on that subject * * *. Whether a 
particular subject of negotiation is embodied by 
the writing depends wholly upon the intent of the 
parties thereto * * *. This intent must be sought 
* * * in the conduct and language of the parties 
and the surrounding circumstances * * *. The 
question being whether certain subjects of nego-
tiation were intended to he covered, we must com-
pare the writing and the negotiations before we 
can determine whether they were in fact covered. 
* * * In deciding upon this intent, the chief and 
most satisfactory index for the judge is found in 
the circumstances whether or not the particular 
element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation is 
dealt with at all in the writing. If it is mentioned, 
covered, or dealt with in the writing, then pre-
sumably the writing was meant to represent all 
of the transaction on that element; if it is not, 
then probably the writing was not intended to 
embody that element of the negotiation." 
It is plaintiff's position that this court has failed 
to consider or apply the rules which it enunciated in the 
Farr case to the uncontradicted facts of this case. 
This court in its present decision did not compare 
the subject of negotiations and the final written instru-
ment as Judge Jeppson did in arriving at his decision. 
This court completely rejects all of the oral evidence 
which outlines the nogotiations. It looked only at the 
writing. As Wigmore explains in his treatise on evi-
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dence, such action does not place the written instrument 
on its proper base nor giv·e an outline of the subject 
matter to he covered by the written instrument, Wig-
more on Evidence, Vol. IX, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2430 - 2431, pp 
97 - 104. 
This court in its decision states that "It is impossible 
to determine how such finding could be reached, except 
by considering parol evidence, since such finding is the 
antethesis of the plain terms of the memorandum." It, 
in effect, is saying that parol evidence cannot be received 
because it is varying the terms of the writing. Wigmore, 
supra, p. 102 points out the error of this kind of reason-
ing in the foil owing language : 
" (a) It is not uncommon to speak of the 
present rule as a rule against 'varying the terms 
of the writing.' No doubt that is precisely the 
result of applying the rule. But it can never serve 
as a test to determine in the first instance whether 
the rule is applicable. The applicabllity and the 
effect of the rule .are distinct things. To employ 
this phrase as a test is to reason in a circle; for 
it is to attempt to decide whether something con-
·ceded to be different from the writing ought to 
·be excluded, by showing that it is different. All 
the phrases about transactions that 'vary,' or 'con-
tradict,' or are 'inconsistent,' involve the same 
futility. The fundamental question is as to the 
intent of the parties to restrict the writing to 
specific elements or subjects of negotiation (ante, 
§ 2430, par. 3); and if that intent existed, then 
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the other subjects of negotiation can he estab-
lished, even though they be (as they usually are) 
different from the writing:'' 
* * * * * * * 
"'(h) It has occasionally been laid down that, 
in ascertaining, in the first instance, the parties' 
intent to embody or not in the writing certain 
subjects of negotiation, 'the writing is the sole 
criterion,' i.e. no search for data of intent can be 
made outside the four corners of the document:" 
* * * * * * * 
"~Such a proposition, however, is untenable, 
both on principle and in practice. In practice, it 
is not enforced by its theoretical advocates. In 
theory, its fallacy is indicated by what has been 
already notice (arnte, §2430). The problem being 
to ascertain whether the parties intended a certain 
writing to cover certain subjects, the relation 
between the writing and those subjects and their 
conduct is necessarily involved; and all these 
matters must be considered.***" 
The Wigmore reasoning which is obviously sound, 
was adopted in this court by the F:arr decision but has 
been ignored by the court in its present decision. 
This court did not examine the writing to see 
whether or not the elements were all dealt with which 
were covered by the oral negotiations between the par-
ties. A mere restatement of the matters which the court 
must pass upon demonstrates that they are not covered 
by the written instrument. For instance, nothing in the 
written instrument covers in any way the contingency 
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which arose, namely, that a total of $2,000.00 was not 
received from the rental of the pastures during the 1953 
season. This contingency, the plaintiff stated, was dis-
cussed orally and it was. agreed that if the rental did not 
amount of $2,000.00, he was to be paid that sum on Octo-
ber 1st. 
Can it ·possibly be claimed that the memorandum 
covered the contingency and as to said matter was an 
integrated written instrument~ That particular element 
is not dealt with any place in the writing and the only 
evidence upon it must be of an oral nature. 
The court underlines the words, "Smith to rent 
pastures" and seems to feel that this language can be 
interpreted to mean that 8mith assumed all responsi-
bilities for the rental of the pastures and would forfeit 
the $2,000.00 which he had earned if the pastures proved 
to be unrentable. This language the trial court inter-
preted in the light of the negotiations between the par-
ties. To arrive at its true meaning necessitated the re-
ceipt and consideration of statements made by both par-
ties and the sele~ction from among the contradictory 
testimonies of what should be believed. Apparently, the 
court assumed that without considering any oral nego-
tiations that "Smith to rent pastures'' meant that if 
Smith did not rent the pastures he forfeited all claim to 
the $2,000.00 fee which he has earned and further that 
he was to rent the pastures regardless of their condition 
or the obstacles which could be placed in his path by de-
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fendant. It is impossible for plaintiff to understand how 
the court can conclude tha;t the phrase, "Smith to rent 
pastures" could be interpreted without considering the 
negotiations between the parties whi'Ch were oral in 
form. Without considering the oral transaction the only 
logical meaning we submit is to conclude that Smith was 
to have the right to n·egotiate rental contracts and would 
undertake to discharge that duty. Certainly, it could not 
be claimed that the forfeiture which this court has de-
creed was a particular element dealt with at all in writ-
ing. 
The court suggests that plaintiff amend his com-
plaint since nothing was pleaded about defendant fixing 
the fence. This suggestion reveals a failure to under-
stand not only the Parol Evidence Rule but our new 
rules of civil procedure. It is no longer necessary to 
plead facts in order to prove them at the trial. It is suf-
ficient to merely plead that defendant owes plaintiff and 
all evidence bearing on the subject may be received. See 
Forms of Complaints, pp. 837 to 844, Vol. 9, U.C.A. 1953. 
There was never any objections by any party during the 
trial to receipt of evidence on the fence being down and 
the pasture not rentable. The evidence is without con-
tradictions and is found throughout the whole transcript 
both from plaintiff and defendant that defendant actu-
ally undertook fencing to enclose the pasture. 
This pasture enclosure agreement is another illu-
stration of a part of the agreement between the parties 
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which cannot be found mentioned at all in the May 1st 
writing. Its proof must be made by showing oral trans-
actions which under the Farr decision and Wigmore's 
prin'ciples is proper. 
The F·arr case, plaintiff submits, sets forth the ap-
plicable principles concerning the use .and application 
of the parol evidence rule. The court in the present case 
has overlooked the Farr decision. It has failed com-
pletely to consider the principles which are set forth in 
Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol 9, p. 97, Sec. 2430-
2431. 
It is respectfully submitted that the quoted agree-
ment of May 1st cannot be classified as a fully integrated 
agreement between plaintiff and defendant concerning 
the arrangements for the commission on the Toone trans-
action. It is obviously a partial integration and as a 
partial integration the trial court and this court must 
consider oral transactions which explain and complete 
the particular elements which are not dealt with at all 
in the written instrument. The only evidence of what 
the parties intended on the matters not contained or 
dealt with at all in the writing can only be resolved by 
resort to their negotiations which were oral in nature 
and which were not embodied in the written instrument. 
It is respectfully subn1itted that this court in its 
decision on the May 1st agreement has deprived plain-
tiff of a commission which was fully earned; that it has 
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done this without considering the legal principles ap-
plicable to the interpretation of said agreement; that 
it has adopted a strained interpretation of the agree-
ment which results in an inequitable and unjust result. 
Plaintiff could understand the resort to a strained inter-
pretation to effect an equitable result but where the 
result is inequitable and deprives a pa1'1ty of a commis-
sion which has been completely earned, it is impossible 
for plaintiff to understand the court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the court has mis-
applied the parol evidence rule and has misconstrued 
an'd misinterpreted the agreement of May 1, 1953; that 
as a result its decision works an inequitable and unjust 
result, and the court should reconsider and reverse its 
ruling as concerns the $2,000.00 commission earned by 
plaintiff on the Toone transaction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS 
& BLACK and DWIGHT L. KING 
Oownsel for Appell.mnt 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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Received ............................ copies of the within Brief 
of Plaintiff this ................ day ·o,f ........................................ , 
A. D. 1955. 
Counsel for Defendant & Respondent 
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